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Government size and trust  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper uses individual level data (the Japanese General Social Survey, 
2001) to examine how government size influences generalized trust. After controlling 
for income inequality, population mobility, city size and various individual 
characteristics, I found: (1) Using all samples, government size is not associated with 
generalized trust, and (2) After splitting the sample into worker and non-worker 
samples, government size does not influence generalized trust for non-workers whereas 
it significantly reduces generalized trust for workers. This suggests that workers, 
through their work experience, might confront the greater bureaucratic red tape coming 
from “larger government”, leading to negative externality effects on the trustful 
relationship in the labor market.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A growing number of researchers have drawn attention to the influence of social 
capital on various facets of human life (e.g., Putnam 1993, 2001; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Uslaner, 2002). It is widely argued that interpersonal trust, considered as a kind of 
social capital, plays an important role in the enhancement of collective action and 
therefore deviation from the „prisoner‟s dilemma‟ (e.g., Putnam 1993; Hayami, 1995; 
Sønderskov 2009; Yamamura 2008b). Transaction costs are anticipated to be saved 
when people trust each other. Accordingly, economic efficiency is improved, resulting in 
economic growth (e.g., Knack, 1997; Knack & Keefer 1997; Whiteley 2000; Zak & Knack, 
2002; Beugelsdijk et al, 2004)1. Trust is thus regarded as a crucial element in economic 
development. How and why is trust formed in society is a critical question when 
considering the foundation of economic development. A growing number of reports have 
tackled this question (Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Berggren and 
Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov 2006; Leigh, 2006 a, 2006b; Chan 2007). 
Previous work has mostly shed light on the effect of socio-economic heterogeneity 
on trust, finding that people are less likely to trust others in more heterogeneous 
societies (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006; Leigh, 2006b; Gustavsson & 
Jordahl 2008) 2 . Besides heterogeneities concerning race, language, and economic 
inequality, there are other important factors influencing trust from the view point of 
political economy. Trust can be regarded as a function of institutions and policies. 
Government decision-making impedes individual decision making in the market when 
government spending increases relative to voluntary spending; the government is 
thought to interrupt market activity. A market oriented economy leads to the formation 
of trust, stimulating further exchange s(Berggren & Jordahl, 2006). On the other hand, 
as found by Goel & Nelson (1998), government size is positively associated with the 
prevalence of corruption, since a larger government leads to greater bureaucratic red 
tape3 . The perception of corruption seems to hamper economic activities such as 
investment (Mauro 1995). Government size is negatively associated with economic 
growth4. Various institutional conditions are important to enhance market transactions 
                                                   
1 Trust is associated with various economic outcomes such as tax compliance (Lassen, 
2007) and loan repayment (Cassar, 2007). 
2 As for economic inequality, in contrast to the United States, Leigh (2006b) found no 
apparent association between trust and inequality across Australia. 
3 In transition countries, a larger government size reduces corruption (Goel and Budak 
2006).  Using various measures of government size, the relationship between 
government size and corruption is not stable (Glaeser & Saks 2006). 
4 The conjecture that resources are allocated less efficiently by larger governments, 
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and the formation of trust (Berggren & Jordahl, 2006)5. Corrupt activity by public 
officials erodes the institutional conditions required to vitalize economic transactions 
along with fostering trust.   
These arguments lead me to conjecture that a larger government results in lower 
trust6. However, little is known about how government size affects trust. Berggren & 
Jordahl (2006) used cross country data to investigate the effect of government size on 
trust, but found no stable relationship between government size and trust. Closer 
examination seems needed to explore the impact of government size because this effect 
varies according to the particular situations confronted by an individual. Government 
size is thought to have a greater effect on workers than non-workers, since workers 
more frequently participate in market transactions. Furthermore, the perception of 
workers depends on whether they belong to the public or private sectors. This paper, 
therefore, attempts to separately investigate the effect of government size on trust for 
workers and non-workers. To this end, I constructed data by combining prefecture and 
individual level data (the Japanese General Social Survey, hereafter JGSS), and used 
this data for statistical analyses. The major finding of this paper is that government 
size reduces the generalized trust of workers, but does not affect that of non-workers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Features of Japanese society 
and the relationship between government size and generalized trust are briefly 
reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the data and methods used. Section 4 
discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers concluding 
observations. 
 
2. Overview of features of Japanese society 
2.1.   Homogeneity and community mechanism 
                                                                                                                                                     
leading to lower economic growth is well supported (e.g., Landau, 1985; Peden & 
Bradley, 1989; Dar & AmirKhalkhalim 2002; Fölster & Herekson, 2002). On the other 
hand, some researchers find no discernable relationship between government size and 
economic growth (e.g., Ram, 1986; Bairam, 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Mendoza et 
al., 1997). 
5 The conditions are the security of property rights, access to sound money, and freedom 
to exchange with foreigners. 
6 Analyzing the influence of government size on economic outcome is thought to be a 
major issue in the field of political economics. There are many reports concerning the 
relationship between government size and economic growth (e.g., Peden & Bradley, 
1989; Dar & Amirkhalkhali 2002; Angelopoulos et al., 2008). Recently, government size 
has been investigated in terms of individual perception. For instance, researchers have 
attempted to tackle the question of how and the extent to which the degree of life 
satisfaction is affected by government size (e.g., Bjørnskov et al., 2007; 2008a; 2008b, 
Yamamura 2009a). 
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Japan is known as a racially homogeneous society (Index Corporation, 2006)7, 
being in the country group with the lowest inequality (Tachibanaki, 2005: Chapter 1). 
Assuming that people have a greater tendency to trust each other in a more 
homogeneous society (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 
2006), this characteristic of Japan leads me to conjecture that the degree of trust in 
Japanese society is high. “The psychological basis of mutual trust could further be 
strengthened by incorporating personal elements in business transactions, such as the 
exchange of gifts and attendances at weddings and funerals” (Hayami 2001, 290). 
Accordingly, Japanese society is characterized not only by racial and economic 
homogeneity, but also by tightly-knit communities, resulting in interdependent trust 
being generated. Trust formed through long-term transactions made a great 
contribution to Japan‟s industrial development in the post-war period (Asanuma, 1989; 
Yamamura 2009b). Hence, when it comes to Japanese society, a high degree of trust 
appears in interpersonal relationships within tightly-knit communities or a business 
groups.  
Reports (Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 2006) have categorized trust into generalized 
and particularized kinds of trust8. “The central idea distinguishing generalized from 
particularized trust is how inclusive your moral community is.” (Uslaner, 2002: 26-27). 
People with generalized trust have positive views toward both their own in-group and 
out-groups, whereas those with particularized trust have positive views of their own 
in-group but a negative attitude toward groups to which they do not belong 9 . 
Generalized trust can be extended to strangers while particularized trust might be 
restricted to within a well-established personal network. Global economic integration 
appears to lead to national social disintegration and therefore the collapse 
tightly-knitted communities (Rodrik 1997). Hence, changes of economic circumstance 
would weaken the competitiveness of firms that have relied on particularized trust in 
the world market. In this situation, generalized trust becomes more important than 
particularized to retain competitiveness.  
 
2.2.   Generalized trust 
                                                   
7 The component ratio of Japanese in the 1996 population was 99 % and suggests that 
Japan can be considered as a racially homogeneous society (Index Corporation, 2006). 
8 Banfield (1958) provided a similar argument based on the case of a Southern Italian 
Village. 
9 Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994) defined what I called particularized trust as “mutual 
assistance”.  Japanese society characterized by preferential treatments given to 
in-group members provides mutual assurance in closed and tightly-knit relationships 
(Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
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I now focus on how prefecture government size is related to the degree of average 
generalized trust in each prefecture. Relationships between average trust and 
government size is shown in Figure1 (1), calculated using all samples. For closer 
examination, I divide the sample into workers and non-workers. The relationships are 
shown in Figure 1 (2) and (3), which are calculated from the workers and non-workers 
samples, respectively.  
A cursory examination of Figure 1(1) shows a slightly negative association between 
government size and average trust. This relationship is unchanged in Figure 1 (2), 
while a slightly positive relationship is observed in Figure 1 (3). These suggest that 
government size has a detrimental effect on the degree that workers generally trust 
others, but does not decrease the generalized trust of non-workers.     
The supply of public goods is determined through political processes, leading supply 
to be different from the optimum level in terms of economics. It is widely acknowledged 
that bureaucrats in the government sector have incentives to maximize their budgets 
(Niskanen 1971). The absence of a profit incentive induces government organizations to 
be less efficient (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977). As a consequence, a government tends to 
become oversized and produce an oversupply of unnecessary public goods. As the cost 
for the supply of public goods is financed through taxation, citizens are likely to criticize 
government policy when the cost of public goods outweighs their benefit. However, a 
government has abundant information, which is difficult for ordinary people to access. 
As a result of this information asymmetry, “government can easily manipulate 
information to inflate the value of the public goods they want to supply” (Hayami 2001, 
p.227). Such manipulation is thought to be easier in the economic developing stage, 
since the average education level of the population is lower and the mass media is not 
sufficiently developed.  
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
This paper uses JGSS data, which are individual level data. The JGSS surveys 
adopt a two-step stratified sampling method and were conducted throughout Japan in 
2001. JGSS is designed to be the Japanese counterpart of the General Social Survey in 
the United States. This survey asks standard questions concerning an individual‟s and 
his/her family characteristics through face-to-face interviews. This data covers 
information related to the one‟s marital and demographic (age and gender) status, level 
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of income, years of schooling, age, number of children, job category10, size of residential 
area, prefecture of residence, and opinion about generalized trust11. According to the 
population size of the geographical area, sample points were divided into three groups; 
(1) large cities, (2) other cities, and (3) villages and towns.  
The survey collected data from 2790 adults, between 20 and 89 years-old. This 
paper deals with the various individual characteristics noted above. Hence, as shown in 
Table 2, the samples used for estimations range between 1611 and 2741. The variables 
used for regression estimations are shown in Table 1, which indicates mean values. 
Years of schooling of workers is 12.1, which is larger than that of non-workers, 
indicating that higher educated people are more likely to work. The Age of workers is 
46.4, which is about 15 years less than that of non-workers. This partly reflects the fact 
that non-workers include retired people. It is interesting that marital status is almost 
same between workers and non-workers, whereas the experience of divorce for workers 
is distinctly larger than for non-workers. 
With respect to generalized trust, considered as a crucial independent variable, 
respondents were all asked: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted?”. The possible responses to this question were "no", "depends", and “yes". Figure 
2 presents the distribution of generalized trust and shows that most male responses 
were „depends‟. Numbers responding „Yes‟ are slightly larger than the „No‟ responders. 
As for the prefecture level data, Gini, immigration rate, and government size are used. 
About one-third of local government revenues consist of local transfer and allocation 
taxes and national government disbursements (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.162). Heavy 
financial support provided by the central to local government is considered the main 
reason why there are variations in local government size12. As referred to later, to 
alleviate any endogenous bias, these variables are lagged by five years. That is, I use 
these variables in 1996. The Gini coefficients of income in 1994 are from the Statistics 
                                                   
10 Jobs are divided into 21 groups ; (1)agriculture, (2)forestry, (3) fisheries, (4) mining, 
(5) building, (6) manufacture, (7) electricity, gas, water supply, (8) transportation, (9) 
wholesale, (10) retail sale, (11) restaurant, (12) finance, insurance, (13) real estate 
business, (14) Mass media, (15) information industry, (16) Medical industry, (17) 
education, (18) law and account, (19) other service industries, (20) public sector, and (21) 
others. Job category dummies were constructed based on these groups. 
11 Data for this secondary analysis, "Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. 
12 About 5 % of GDP is allocated to financial support for local governments. According to 
Doi & Ihori (2002), people and firms in urban regions, which hold about 60 % of the 
population of Japan, pay about 75 % of the annual national taxes. However, they receive 
fewer grants than do those in rural regions.  
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Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications13. Immigrants and 
prefecture populations are from the Asahi Shimbun (2004). The immigration rate is 
measured by (number of immigrants from another prefecture / Population). Using 
government expenditure and income obtained from the Index Corporation (2006), 
government size is measured by (Government expenditure/ Income).  
 
3.2.  Methods 
 
  In line with the discussion above, the estimated function of trust then takes the 
following form: 
TRUST ipv= 0 + 1 GOVSIZE p + 2IMIGRAp + 3GINIp + 4EDUipv +5AGEipv+ 
6MALEipv + 7INCOMipv + +8MARRYipv+9CHILDipv +10DIVipv 
+11MCITYipv +12TOWNipv +λv+ωipv , 
 
where TRUST represents the degree of generalized trust ranging from 1 to 3 in 
individual i, prefecture p, and individual‟s job category v. ‟s represents the regression 
parameters. λv represents the unobservable specific effects of v „s job categories, which 
is captured by job category dummies ; ωit represents the error term.   
The model is estimated using the Ordered Probit method because the dependent 
variable is ordered. The estimated coefficients of the Ordered Probit method do not 
indicate the magnitude of the effect. Hence, following Fischer and Torgler (2005), I also 
compute the marginal effects for the highest level of generalized trust. In addition, to 
check the robustness of the estimation results, using a sample where responses to the 
question about generalized trust were “yes", or "no", I attempt to apply the Probit 
method.   
     The effects of each variable on trust are now discussed. The key variable is 
government size, represented as GOVSIZE. From the discussion above, GOVSIZE is 
expected to take a negative sign. Heterogeneous society discourages people from 
trusting others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). For the purpose of capturing 
socio-economic heterogeneity, IMIGRA and GINI are incorporated as independent 
variables. Immigrants coming from another prefecture leads to a more culturally 
heterogeneous society, resulting in the decline of interpersonal trust. This conjecture is 
in line with the finding that the number of immigrants from other prefectures decreases 
interpersonal trust, although Japanese society is a racially heterogeneous society 
                                                   
13 Gini data at the prefecture level are obtained every five years; as 1996 data is not 
available, I used 1994 data. 
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(Yamamura, 2008a)14. With the aim of capturing this effect, the rate of immigrants, 
IMIGRA, is incorporated as a dependent variable. The anticipated sign of IMIGRA is 
negative. With respect to economic inequality considered as economic heterogeneity, 
GINI (Gini coefficients) has been found to be negatively associated with trust (e.g., 
Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006; Chan2007; Yamamura 2008a). It is 
necessary to deal with the endogenous problem, which has recently been stressed in 
some reports (e.g., Leigh 2006a; Bjørnskov 2006; Gustavsson & Jordahl, 2008). With the 
aim of alleviating potential endogenous problems with Government size, rates of 
immigrants and the Gini coefficient, these prefecture level variables are lagged five 
years.  
From previous reports (Zak & Knack 2001; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002), EDU will 
be positively correlated with trust and take a positive sign. The more educated people 
are, the more they are inclined to work and trust each other than to spend time 
verifying each others‟ actions, this is because the opportunity cost of this for them is 
high (Zak and Knack, 2001). As a consequence, the sign of EDU is predicted to become 
positive. Existing reports note that the level of income increases generalized trust 
(Alesina & La Ferrara 2000). Hence, the anticipated sign of INCOM becomes positive. It 
is reasonably assumed that a larger population is more diverse, which controls for the 
heterogeneity that cannot be captured by heterogeneity variables as above (Bjørnskov 
2006). Hence, MCITY (medium size city) and TOWN (towns and village) dummies are 
predicted to take positive signs and the value of TOWN becomes larger than that of 
MCITY.  
Turning to family structure and marital status, people who trust more also tend to 
marry more easily. Furthermore, married people are more likely to meet and be 
acquainted with people through their spouse‟s personal network. Because of their 
frequent contact with unknown people, married people become more sociable than 
singles. Accordingly, married people are more inclined to trust others. People with 
children are likely to have opportunities to interact with other parents through PTA 
meetings and various events for children held by community associations, leading 
parents to be integrated into interpersonal networks. These activities lead parents to be 
more likely to trust others through their interpersonal interactions. As a consequence, 
the sign for MARRY and CHILD are anticipated to become positive. Experience of 
divorce, DIV, is considered as a kind of trauma. DIV is included as a dependent variable 
                                                   
14 Contrarily, there is an optimistic view that the openness of a society leads to the 
formation of generalized trust (Chan, 2007). Chan (2007) examined the impact of global 
integration on generalized trust and found the positive openness-trust relationship. 
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to examine how trauma influences people‟s trust (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002). Several 
control variables are also included to capture individual characteristics: age (AGE) and 
male‟s dummy (MALE). 
 
4. Results 
4.1.   Ordered Probit Model. 
 
Table 2 reports the results using all samples. After splitting the total sample into 
workers and non-workers, estimations are conducted to compare workers with 
non-workers about the effects of government size on trust. Table 3 shows the results 
using the non-workers sample and Table 4 shows those using the workers sample. 
Government size is not thought to have the same effect on different types of work. For 
instance, workers in the public sector seem to benefit from government size because the 
larger labor demanded by larger government is one of the reasons that these workers 
have a job. There are also industries that can be protected by the government and so get 
finance. Workers in the public sector and protected industries are not disturbed by 
government when they work. It is thus necessary to control for the difference in the 
relationship with government among industries. To control for the features of work 
respondents, job category dummies are added as independent variables when 
estimations using the worker sample are applied. These results are presented in Table 5. 
Following Fisher and Torgler (2006), because the estimated coefficients do not indicate 
the magnitude of the effect, I compute marginal effects for the highest level of social 
capital. These marginal effects are shown in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. As previously noted, 
the question related to generalized trust is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted?”. The three possible responses to this question are "no", "depends", 
and “yes". Respondents who chose "depends" are thought to have a neutral and 
ambiguous standpoint. I conduct the estimation by excluding them to restrict the 
sample to distinct positions; these results are shown in Table 6.  
Turning to Table 2, GOVSIZE indicates negative signs in all estimations, 
consistent with anticipation, but does not show statistical significance. This implies 
that government size does not appear to generally influence the degree of trust. 
Contrary to the prediction, IMIGRA has a positive sign, despite being statistically 
insignificant. The signs of GINI are positive in column (1) and negative in columns (2) 
and (3), while not being statistically significant. These results indicate that variables to 
capture socio-economic heterogeneity do not influence trust. EDU and INCOM yield 
positive significant signs in all estimations, as anticipated. The significant positive sign 
10 
 
of CHILD support the previous arguments that having a child leads parents to become 
involved in interpersonal networks and to trust others. Consistent with the prediction, 
both TOWN and MCITY show positive signs. Furthermore, in all cases, the marginal 
effects of TOWN are about two times larger than those of MCITY. As mentioned earlier, 
the homogeneity of non-urban areas is a reason why TOWN and MCITY take positive 
signs. In other interpretations, the results of TOWN and MCITY are thought to reflect 
that residents in non-urban areas are less likely to meet strangers and so are more 
inclined to maintain stable relationships with colleagues within a closed community. 
That is, long-term interpersonal relationships lead people to trust “community 
members”. This kind of trust is considered particularized trust, rather than generalize.    
With respect to Table 3, the positive sign of GOVSIZE shows that government size 
does not reduce the degree of non-worker‟s trust. The reason why GOVESIZE does not 
take the expected sign might be that bureaucratic red tape stemming from government 
is less apt to be associated with daily life, such community association activities, and so 
is less likely to be perceived by non-workers. Non-workers are less inclined to suffer 
from the negative externality caused by government. IMIGRA and GINI yield the 
unexpected positive signs in all estimations, but are not statistically significant. EDU 
takes a positive sign but is not statistically significant. Education is thus not important 
for forming trustful relationships in non-market activities. I interpret these results of 
EDU as suggesting that the opportunity cost of verifying each others‟ actions are not 
high for non-workers, even if they are highly educated. As a consequence, the level of 
education does not lead non-workers to trust. This is consistent with the argument of 
Zak and Knack (2001). Besides the results of GOVSIZE, those of other variables in 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 are similar to those in Table 2. Hence, I will put focus on results of 
GOVSIZE hereafter.  
In Table 4, it is interesting to observe that all signs of GOVESIZE are negative and 
statistically significant in columns (2) and (3), implying that Government size 
discourages workers from trusting others. Table 5 shows that GOVSIZE produces 
significant negative signs in all estimations. Overall, the absolute values of z-statistics 
in table 5 are larger than those in table 4. What is more, the absolute marginal effects 
are smaller than 0.5 in Table 4, whereas they are larger than 0.5 in Table 5. This means 
that the negative effects of government size in table 5 are more significant and larger 
than in those in table 4. From this I derive the argument that controlling for benefits, 
which are given to particular industries by the government, makes it more evident that 
government discourages workers from trusting others. In Japan, lobbying activity by 
local interest groups living in rural and agricultural areas results in numerous deficits 
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(Doi & Ihori 2002; Doi & Ihori 2009, Ch.7). Workers in an over-funded industry can 
enjoy the benefits given by government and so trustful relationships do not collapse 
within that industry15. On the other hand, workers in an over-funded industry are 
thought to be envied by workers in other industries, leading to friction and distrust 
between workers in over-funded industries and the others. What is more, the cost for 
the supply of public goods is financed through taxation16. That is, workers in the public 
sector are employed by the government and so rely on the contributions of tax payers. A 
lack of competition leads public sector‟s workers to provide lower quality service than 
service provided by the private sector. Nevertheless, even if this is true, public sector‟s 
workers do not lose their jobs. This situation leads private sector workers to distrust 
public sector ones. 
The combined results of Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicate that government size does not 
generally affect the magnitude of generalized trust. Nevertheless, closer examination 
tells us that government size has a detriment effect on the generalized trust of workers, 
but has no influence on that of non-workers. It follows from this that government size 
hampers mutual trust in market transactions, but not in non-market activities. 
Government is considered to disturb efficient market transactions and so destroy 
trustful relationships among individuals. Eventually, the larger a government becomes, 
the higher the transaction costs to the market. Government hampers the formation of 
social capital, resulting in impediment of economic development. This channel has been 
hardly been acknowledged, but is considered important from the view point of public 
choice theory.     
 
4.2.   Probit model. 
 
To check the robustness of the results obtained above, I look at the results presented 
in Table 6. Full sample and non-workers results are presented in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. In line with the results in Tables 2 and 3, the results are not statistically 
significant. With respect of the results using the workers sample, in column (3), the 
results of GOVSIZE without job category dummies show that coefficients take negative 
signs and are statistically significant at the 5 % level. The absolute marginal effect is 
                                                   
15 „Agricultural-related public capital, fishing ports, flood control, and forest 
conservation have been over funded as a result of the lobbying activities of local-interest 
groups‟ (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.181). 
16 In Japan, items subject to the local taxes, and the tax rates, are specified in the Local 
Tax Law. This is a national law; local governments have very little authority to set local 
tax rates or impose local taxes (Doi & Ihori 2009, p. 157). 
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0.93, which is about two times larger than the corresponding results of the Ordered 
Probit model shown in column (1) of Table 4. Looking at column (4), which has the 
results with job category dummies, it is shown that the sign of GOVSIZE is negative, 
while being statistically significant at the 1 % level. The absolute marginal effect is 1.74, 
which is about three times larger than the corresponding result using the Ordered 
Probit model appearing in column (1) of Table 5. The results are consistent with Tables 
2, 3, 4, and 5; even when I discard the samples that show an ambiguous attitude against 
the question concerning trust. That is, alternative estimations show that results are 
unchanged and so what has been argued thus far can be strongly supported. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores the question of how government influences generalized trust, 
something that is considered beneficial for various economic activities. Using individual 
level data, it is found that government size is not associated with generalized trust for 
non-workers, while government size is negatively associated with generalized trust for 
workers. This suggests that greater the bureaucratic red tape coming from larger 
government is confronted and is perceived by workers work experience. On the other 
hand, non-workers do not perceive the corruption caused by large government so their 
generalized trust is not affected. Furthermore, for workers, government size has a 
larger negative effect on generalized trust after controlling for a worker‟s job categories. 
This leads me to argue that: Some industries consist of special interest groups that 
benefit from particular government actions. Hence, the effect of government size varies 
according to the job category.  
Besides the direct influence of government on economic inefficiency through 
rent-seeking activities (Niskanen 1971), government reduces generalized trust among 
workers, resulting in the failure of collective action and high transaction costs, causing 
economic inefficiency. An individual‟s economic activity basically relies on mutual trust, 
which appears hindered by interruptions from government. The negative relationship 
between corruption and economic growth is established (Mauro 1995). This negative 
relationship can be considered in part the outcome of a decrease of generalized trust, an 
issue that to date has not been well considered. The main contribution of this paper is to 
suggest that there is an indirect negative effect of government size on economic activity.  
Evidence provided in this research paper has been deduced from Japanese data 
sources. The effect of government size appears different between developing and 
developed stage (Yamamura 2009a). Furthermore, the extent of generalized trust 
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depends on the characteristics of countries such as culture and history. Hence, it is not 
clear that this paper ‟s argument holds for other countries. Thus, further research will 
be required to gather individual data from various countries to more closely examine 
the effects of government size on generalized trust.   
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Table 1.  Variable definitions and comparison between workers and non-workers 
 
Variables Definition Workers Non- 
workers 
 Prefecture level data   
GOVSIZE Government expenditure/ Income 
 in 1996 
 0.13 
 
0.14 
IMIGRA 
 
Rates of immigrant from other prefectures in 1996  0.02 
 
 0.02 
GINI Gini coefficient of income in 1994. 
 
 0.29  0.29 
  Individual level data   
GTRUST 
 
Generalized trust.  
Values range from 1 (No) to 3 (Yes) 
 2.11 2.05 
EDU 
 
Years of schooling  12.1 10.8 
AGE 
 
Ages 
 
 46.4  60.7 
MALE 
 
Male dummy, which takes 1 if individual is male, 
otherwise 0. 
 0.54  0.30 
INCOM 
 
Household income (10 million Yen)  0.71  0.46 
MARRY 
 
Marriage dummy, which takes 1 if individual is 
married, otherwise 0. 
0.74  0.72 
CHILD 
 
Number of children  1.59 1.95 
DIV 
 
Divorce dummy, which takes 1 if individual experience 
divorce, otherwise 0. 
 0.72  0.47 
MCITY 
 
Medium size cities dummy, which takes 1 if residential 
place is in medium size cities, otherwise 0. 
 0.57  0.56 
TOWN 
 
Towns and villages dummy, which takes 1 if 
residential place is in towns or villages, otherwise 0. 
 0.24  0.24 
Note: Values are simple averages. Data sourced from the Asahi Shimbun (2004) and 
Index Publishing (2006), and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (various years).   
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Table 2.  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Ordered Probit (All samples).  
 (1) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(2) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(3) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
GOVSIZE -0.14 
(-0.24) 
-0.04 -0.36 
(-0.64) 
-0.11 -0.60 
(-1.33) 
-0.18 
IMIGRA 
 
3.61 
(0.71) 
1.13 0.79 
(0.17) 
0.24 0.37 
(0.10) 
0.11 
GINI 0.07 
(0.04) 
0.02 -0.94 
(-0.51) 
-0.29 -1.19 
(-0.79) 
-0.36 
EDU 
 
0.04** 
(2.76) 
0.01 0.05** 
(3.38) 
0.01 0.05** 
(4.80) 
0.01 
AGE 
 
-0.002 
(-1.07) 
-0.0008 -0.001 
(-0.50) 
-0.003 -0.001 
(-0.67) 
-0.003 
MALE 
 
0.12* 
(2.07) 
0.03 0.09* 
(1.74) 
0.02 0.06 
(1.40) 
0.18 
INCOM 
 
0.33** 
(4.55) 
0.10 0.32** 
(4.84) 
0.10   
MARRY 
 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
-0.003     
CHILD 
 
0.06* 
(2.01) 
0.01     
DIV 
 
0.006 
(0.05) 
0.002     
MCITY 
 
0.23* 
(1.78) 
0.04 0.11 
(1.60) 
0.03 0.08 
(1.37) 
0.02 
TOWN 
 
0.28** 
(2.85) 
0.09 0.27** 
(2.97) 
0.09 0.13* 
(1.82) 
0.04 
Obs 1611  1809  2741  
Pseudo-R 2 0.02  0.02  0.009  
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the averages of the highest category. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate 
significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Ordered Probit (Non-worker).  
 (1) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(2) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(3) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
GOVSIZE 1.34 
(1.40) 
0.38 1.06 
(1.15) 
0.30 0.87 
(1.20) 
0.24 
IMIGRA 
 
6.83 
(0.87) 
1.96 4.70 
(0.61) 
1.34 1.04 
(0.17) 
0.29 
GINI 3.99 
(1.31) 
1.14 3.94 
(1.41) 
1.13 0.87 
(0.39) 
0.24 
EDU 
 
0.04 
(0.90) 
0.005 0.02 
(1.17) 
0.007 0.02 
(1.19) 
0.005 
AGE 
 
-0.006 
(-1.63) 
-0.001 -0.005* 
(-1.80) 
-0.001 -0.006** 
(-2.66) 
-0.001 
MALE 
 
0.17 
(1.47) 
0.05 0.17* 
(1.67) 
0.05 0.11 
(1.40) 
0.03 
INCOM 
 
0.22* 
(1.74) 
0.06 0.24* 
(2.06) 
0.07   
MARRY 
 
0.04 
(0.34) 
0.01     
CHILD 
 
0.01 
(0.31) 
0.004     
DIV 
 
0.11 
(0.60) 
0.03     
MCITY 
 
0.11 
(0.92) 
0.03 0.12 
(1.01) 
0.03 0.08 
(0.84) 
0.02 
TOWN 
 
0.32* 
(1.96) 
0.09 0.20* 
(1.95) 
0.09 0.08 
(0.70) 
0.02 
Obs 642  689  1066  
Pseudo-R 2 0.01  0.01  0.01  
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the averages of the highest category. Numbers 
in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate 
significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Ordered Probit 
 (Workers without job category dummies).  
 (1) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(2) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(3) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
GOVSIZE -1.10 
(-1.39) 
-0.36 -1.26* 
(-1.70) 
-0.41 -1.49** 
(-2.54) 
-0.47 
IMIGRA 
 
1.50 
(0.22) 
0.49 -1.21 
(-0.20) 
-0.40 0.80 
(0.16) 
0.25 
GINI -3.93 
(-1.50) 
-1.29 -4.85* 
(-2.09) 
-1.59 -2.75 
(-1.30) 
-0.87 
EDU 
 
0.07** 
(3.15) 
0.02 0.08** 
(3.84) 
0.02 0.09** 
(5.41) 
0.02 
AGE 
 
0.004 
(0.13) 
0.0001 0.002 
(0.97) 
0.001 0.004* 
(1.89) 
0.001 
MALE 
 
0.10 
(1.39) 
0.02 0.05 
(0.80) 
0.01 0.03 
(0.55) 
0.009 
INCOM 
 
0.35** 
(3.70) 
0.11 0.32** 
(3.82) 
0.10   
MARRY 
 
-0.13 
(-0.83) 
-0.04     
CHILD 
 
0.09* 
(2.16) 
0.03     
DIV 
 
-0.06 
(-0.36) 
-0.02     
MCITY 
 
0.13 
(1.43) 
0.04 0.09 
(1.08) 
0.03 0.07 
(0.96) 
0.02 
TOWN 
 
0.25* 
(2.08) 
0.08 0.25* 
(2.18) 
0.08 0.15* 
(1.70) 
0.05 
Job category 
dummies 
No  No  No  
Obs 969  1120  1675  
Pseudo-R 2 0.02  0.02  0.01  
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the averages of the highest category. Numbers 
in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate 
significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Ordered Probit 
 (Workers with job category dummies).  
 (1) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(2) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
(3) 
Coeff. 
 
Marginal 
GOVSIZE -1.58* 
(-1.96) 
-0.53 -1.57* 
(-2.06) 
-0.51 -1.68** 
(-2.83) 
-0.53 
IMIGRA 
 
-0.51 
(-0.08) 
-0.17 -2.76 
(-0.46) 
-0.90 -0.64 
(-0.13) 
-0.20 
GINI -3.64 
(-1.33) 
-1.22 -3.62 
(-1.47) 
-1.18 -1.82 
(-0.87) 
-0.57 
EDU 
 
0.06** 
(2.49) 
0.02 0.07** 
(3.18) 
0.02 0.07** 
(3.98) 
0.02 
AGE 
 
-0.0008 
(-0.22) 
-0.0002 0.001 
(0.50) 
0.0005 0.003 
(1.50) 
0.001 
MALE 
 
0.13 
(1.61) 
0.04 0.05 
(0.76) 
0.01 0.03 
(0.58) 
0.01 
INCOM 
 
0.32** 
(3.26) 
0.10 0.30** 
(3.41) 
0.09   
MARRY 
 
-0.18 
(-1.11) 
-0.06     
CHILD 
 
0.08* 
(2.02) 
0.02     
DIV 
 
-0.10 
(-0.59) 
-0.03     
MCITY 
 
0.16* 
(1.71) 
0.05 0.13 
(1.45) 
0.04 0.09 
(1.20) 
0.02 
TOWN 
 
0.30** 
(2.38) 
0.10 0.29** 
(2.51) 
0.10 0.19* 
(2.07) 
0.06 
Job category 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs 966  1115  1664  
Pseudo-R 2 0.04  0.04  0.02  
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the averages of the highest category. Numbers 
in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate 
significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.  Determinants of Generalized Trust (Excluding „depends‟ samples): Probit 
 (1) 
Workers & 
Non-work
ers 
 
Coeff. 
 
 
 
 
Marginal 
(2) 
Non- 
Workers 
 
Coeff. 
 
 
 
 
Marginal 
(3) 
Workers 
 
 
Coeff. 
 
 
 
 
Marginal 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 
Coeff. 
 
 
 
 
Marginal 
GOVSIZE -0.71 
(-0.66) 
-0.26 
 
2.09 
(1.15) 
0.82 
 
-2.72* 
(-1.98) 
-0.93 -4.87** 
(-3.13) 
-1.74 
IMIGRA 
 
7.07 
(0.71) 
2.61 
 
15.7 
(1.00) 
6.19 
 
1.26 
(0.09) 
0.43 
 
-5.37 
(-0.40) 
-1.92 
 
GINI 0.57 
(0.16) 
0.21 
 
7.75 
(1.30) 
3.04 
 
-7.05 
(-1.50) 
-2.41 
 
-7.26 
(-1.50) 
-2.59 
 
EDU 
 
0.06** 
(2.36) 
0.02 
 
0.03 
(0.85) 
0.01 
 
0.12** 
(2.77) 
0.04 0.11** 
(2.37) 
0.04 
 
AGE 
 
-0.005 
(-1.21) 
-0.001 
 
-0.01* 
(-1.83) 
-0.005 
 
0.0008 
(0.13) 
0.0002 
 
0.002 
(0.31) 
0.0008 
 
MALE 
 
0.19* 
(1.81) 
0.07 
 
0.29 
(1.49) 
0.11 
 
0.19 
(1.35) 
0.06 
 
0.22 
(1.30) 
0.08 
 
INCOM 
 
0.77** 
(5.33) 
0.28 
 
0.45* 
(1.77) 
0.17 
 
0.95** 
(4.72) 
0.32 0.89** 
(4.03) 
0.31 
 
MARRY 
 
-0.02 
(-0.12) 
-0.008 
 
0.11 
(0.47) 
0.04 
 
-0.27 
(-0.85) 
-0.08 
 
-0.33 
(-1.00) 
-0.11 
 
CHILD 
 
0.13** 
(2.42) 
0.04 
 
0.06 
(0.70) 
0.02 
 
0.18** 
(2.50) 
0.06 0.17* 
(2.27) 
0.06 
 
DIV 
 
-0.04 
(-0.22) 
-0.01 
 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.03 
 
-0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 0.03 
(0.12) 
0.01 
 
MCITY 
 
0.13 
(0.87) 
0.04 
 
0.20 
(0.91) 
0.08 
 
0.06 
(0.30) 
0.02 0.16 
(0.76) 
0.06 
 
TOWN 
 
0.37* 
(2.03) 
0.13 
 
0.49* 
(1.79) 
0.18 
 
0.27 
(1.05) 
0.09 
 
0.44 
(1.63) 
0.14 
 
Job 
category 
dummies 
No  No  No  Yes  
Obs 637  244  393  357  
Pseudo R 2 0.08  0.07  0.12  0.15  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 (1). Relationship between government size and average trust. (All sample) 
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Figure 1 (2). Relationship between government size and average trust. (Workers) 
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Figure 1 (3). Relationship between government size and average trust. (Non-workers) 
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Figure 2. Distribution of trust 
 
